When considering the extent to which the United States Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business, today's historians and constitutional theorists treat the question as a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against government power. Moreover, modern scholars commonly maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant tradition in constitutional history. Tracing it back to the tenants of Jacksonian democracy that emphasized distrust of government, they imply that constitutional history has developed as a straight line: always with an emphasis on individual liberty and always with a presumption that entrepreneurial liberty should be favored over governments power to regulate. This paper will use the 1877 case Munn v. Illinois to demonstrate that prior to the late 1880s the paradigm for determining the constitution's limits on government regulation of business was actually quite different. There is no doubt that the Court has always emphatically recognized the importance of property rights. Nevertheless, during the first century under the Constitution, it treated business regulation as a matter of balancing entrepreneurial liberty against the rights of the community. Furthermore, it consistently held that, because state economic regulations were an expression of popular sovereignty and rights of the community, they should be presumed to be valid.
I. INTRODUCTION
When considering the extent to which the United States Constitution places a limit on government regulation of business, today's historians and constitutional theorists treat the question as a matter of balancing economic liberty or property rights against government power. Moreover, modern scholars commonly maintain that this balancing formula represents the predominant tradition in constitutional history. Some commentators trace the tradition to the tenants of Jacksonian democracy that emphasized individual liberty and distrust of government. 1 Others, who trace it back to the founding, argue that, "The Supreme Court maintained an astonishingly constant vision during its first 150 years." 2 In either case, today's conventional narrative depicts constitutional history as having developed along a straight line: always with an emphasis on individual liberty and always with a presumption that entrepreneurial liberty should be favored over governments power to regulate. That debate secured Munn's place in history. According to the conventional narrative, Munn plays a significant role as a steppingstone in the straight-line evolution of constitutional doctrine that emphasizes entrepreneurial liberty. Waite's concession and Field's dissent laid the foundation for an era of constitutional history sometimes referred to as the laissez-faire era. Although the most fundamental meaning of due process was that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the benefit of proper judicial hearing and procedure, Waite and Field are said to have recognized that it promised something more. It was also meant to protect private rights from arbitrary government interference, regardless of whether that interference came from properly enacted legislation. Thus Munn is said to have opened the door for a theory that viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool for balancing economic liberty from government power: a theory that would eventually become constitutional doctrine in the mid-1890s and predominate until 1937. 5 At its high point the Court applied a presumption that, in order for economic regulation to be constitutional, a state must demonstrate that the regulation fell within what was called the "legitimate police powers of the state." And, for the most part, it also subscribed to a narrow definition of what constituted the legitimate police powers of the state. Under this narrative Munn thus has a place in constitutional history not for what it did, but rather as a signal of things to come. It is usually treated as a window to the future.
By looking at what the Court actually did in Munn --what it held and what rationale it applied to reach its decision --it becomes apparent that Munn is also a window to the past. A closer look at the case and the events surrounding it will demonstrate that the majority in Munn actually based its opinion on the traditional emphasis on rights of the community. It will further demonstrate that for more than a decade after the opinion the Supreme Court steadfastly clung to that traditional view.
And it did so even in the face of persistent efforts on the part of lawyers for a corporate 5 . William M. Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America 1886-1937 112 (1998) notes that, "All Justices of the Supreme Court in the last third of the nineteenth century agreed with Madison that the fundamental challenge of American Constitutionalism was mediating between the power of government and the liberty of the individual." elite to change traditional constitutional doctrine. Their campaign to change traditional doctrine involved: maintaining that government regulation of business was the equivalent to confiscation of property, expanding the constitutional rights afforded to corporations, and reversing the traditional rule that economic regulation should be presumed valid. These changes eventually raised entrepreneurial liberty to preferred status under the Constitution, but they did not come about until well into the Gilded Age
II. RIGHTS OF THE COMMUNITY
The dispute of which the Granger Cases were a part was shaped in large degree by rapid changes in the economic and social landscape. America in the late 1870s was evolving from a predominantly local economic system to one that was national and interconnected. It was a revolution in commerce that entirely changed the way that people did business. And, to a large extent, it depended on a new system of transportation that centered on railroads. In fact, Munn v. Illinois was the only one of eight related Granger cases that did not involve regulation of railroads but even the regulation of grain warehouses in Munn was part of a system of commerce linked to railroads.
In the late 1860s, business leaders from small towns took the lead in calling for state control over the railroads. By the early 1870s, farmers who had become organized as part of the Granger movement joined the bourgeoning push for railroad reform. The terms Grange or Granger were the popular names of the Patrons of Husbandry, a farmers' alliance that came into being in 1867. Although it began as a cooperative movement to encourage education and trade among farmers, the Grangers quickly developed a political presence.
The Granger movement grew at an astonishing rate, and in 1873 and 1874 farmers' organizations placed a significant number of sympathetic representatives in the legislatures of Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Working with merchants, shippers, and civic leaders they helped enact laws that created railroad commissions to regulate railroads, prohibited railroads from discriminating among customers, and set maximum rates railroads and grain warehouses could charge for their services. The 4/10/11 6 Grangers influence in passing reform legislation has probably been exaggerated. 6 Nevertheless, the image of the Grangers as an agrarian revolt captured the popular imagination and the movement gave its name to Munn v. Illinois and the related Granger
Cases.
Economic self-interest played a role in the railroad reform movement. The small town merchant, the shipper, or the farmer may not have been able to articulate in the language of economics their complaints about railroad ratemaking, but they understood the feeling of being gouged. Although most reformers agreed that the railroads had a right to make a profit, they also believed that companies did not have the right to set rates arbitrarily without regard to fairness.
But raw self-interest was not the only concern in what became known as "the railroad problem." Fear also played a role. Railroads were transforming the country from a commercial system made of regional and local economies to a system dominated by a national economy. Even under the old system outside forces, like the weather or price of grain, impacted on the livelihood of small town merchants and farmers. Now, swift transportation allowed farm products to be sold at distant locations. Massive storage facilities that mixed one farmer's produce with another's allowed financiers to speculate in futures. 7 In this new national commercial system outside forces, over which they had no control, had an even greater impact on the wellbeing of farmers and small town shippers. James F. Hudson captured the feeling when he complained that railroads "hold a greater power over the fortunes and prosperity of individuals and communities than we have ever intrusted [sic] to our government." 8 Many reformers were motivated by a desire to take back some control of their own economic destiny. 9
Reformers intuitively understood that individuals could not achieve that fairness or take back control of their economic destiny on their own. Granger leader D.W. Adams told his followers that against the railroads, "the people, in their individual capacity, are powerless and only through their united action as sovereigns can they obtain redress." 10
In the minds of many railroad reformers government alone had the strength to counterbalance the power and privilege of the railroad corporation and it could do so by enacting legislation regulating railroad rates and other practices.
Reformers' instinct to turn to regulation was no surprise. Regulation of business was common in nineteenth century America. There was plenty of precedent in American history for regulating prices and business practices. Mills, markets, hackmen (cabbies), draymen (truckers), taverns, inns, and various professions were just some of the businesses that states commonly regulated. 11 The pervasiveness of regulations of business practices undoubtedly reflects an understanding among the era's people, policy makers, and judges that, while the right to own private property was inviolable, the uses to which it might be put was subject to regulation.
Even so, on some theoretical level, the idea of regulating railroad rates and business practices ran afoul of American society's traditional respect for the rights of private property. It is because of this that the Granger laws and the Granger Cases are often depicted as a conflict between governmental power and private rights. As one opponent of regulation described it: "the power of the community to regulate business against the right of the citizen to enjoy the rewards of his enterprise." 12 Indeed, The flip side of this belief that popular sovereignty justified state regulation of railroads and other corporations was reformers' fear that the growing political power of wealthy corporations threatened popular sovereignty itself. This fear also found expression in the Illinois Constitutional Convention where William P. Peirce, for example warned the delegation that, "One of the greatest dangers to our republic is the great and rapidly increasing wealth, the great extension and consolidation of railroad corporations and chartered monopolies." 16
The Illinois Constitutional Convention adopted, and the people ratified, reform measures that gave the legislature broad powers to regulate railroads and warehouses. In the following years the Illinois legislature passed several laws that were typical of the Granger laws enacted in other Midwestern states. One required that railroads charge uniform rates for any class of goods. This so-called "anti-discrimination provision" also specifically outlawed the practice of charging higher rates for a short haul from a town to a center of commerce than for a long haul from one center of commerce to another. A second act created a Board of Warehouse Commissioners, which was given the power to 13 As might be expected, much of the opposition to the Granger laws came from railroad leaders. Some of these were practical complaints. Railroad leaders argued that public authorities, be they legislatures or commissions, were not competent to determine proper rates and that the rates they set would be unfair. 18 The resulting rates, they predicted, would drive out capital and make it impossible for railroads to meet their obligations to bondholders. 19 The railroad leaders' most significant contention was that the Granger laws violated their "exclusive right to fix the rate of transportation." 20 Sometimes they insisted that they derived this right from their charters. 21 Although railroad leaders hoped to repeal or revise the Granger laws, they did not trust state legislatures. Railroad historian, Thomas C. Cochran noted, "Railroad men generally expected more favorable consideration from courts than from legislatures or commissions, more from judges than from juries, and more from the highest courts than from inferior ones." 24 Letters between these men reveal that they also preferred federal courts to state courts. 25 They also reveal that railroad leaders understood the legal issues involved.
Railroad lawyers steadfastly advised their clients that the Granger laws would not pass constitutional muster and polished the legal theories upon which the railroads would rely. Their advice set off a flurry of lawsuits in both the state and federal courts. The affected companies employed two tactics to get their cases into court: they either ignored the Granger legislation, thus forcing the states to sue for enforcement, or they initiated lawsuits that directly challenged the validity of the laws. 26 Either way, the railroad lawyers' first contention in all the Granger cases except Munn was that the state's effort to legislate rate regulation violated the Article I, section 10 guarantees that "no state shall pass any law … impairing the obligation of contract."
In contract clause doctrine, franchises and acts of incorporation were considered a contract between the state and the corporation it had created. 27 In theory a subsequent law placing new conditions on the corporation would alter the terms of its franchise, thus impairing the obligation of that contract. In Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad
Company v. Iowa railroad lawyers maintained the Granger laws did just that. In this and the other Granger cases the railroads' grants were silent on the subject of who had the ratemaking power. Yet lawyers argued that the company's right to determine the rates they would charge was an inherent part of their contract. rejected this contention. "Railroad companies are carriers for hire," Chief Justice Waite reasoned. "They are incorporated as such, and are given extraordinary powers, in order that they may better serve the public in that capacity." As such, he concluded, they are "subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight, unless protected by their charters." 28 Even when the charter had an express provision allowing the company to determine reasonable rates, as in Peik v. Chicago and North Western Railway Company v. Lawrence, subsequent legislation regulating rates might not violate the contract clause.
The reason was that contract clause doctrine included several exceptions to the inviolability of the corporate franchise. The most important of these recognized the state's right to include a provision in the grant reserving to itself the power to later revise the agreement. In Peik the Court noted that the existence of such a reserve clause meant the state had the power to pass subsequent legislation that set maximum rates.
A state's reliance on reserve clauses was, however, also subject to limitations.
Under standard Contract Clause doctrine of the time, even a reserve clause would not give a state the power to defeat or substantially impair the essential object of the grant or any rights vested under it. 29 Under traditional doctrine the notion of what constituted "the essential object of the grant" was broad enough to make the Contract Clause a useful tool for protecting existing corporations. 30 A corporation might turn to the contract clause to claim its franchise was exclusive and the state could not offer a new grant to a competitor. It might claim exemption from taxation, or from subsequent state regulation.
It was so useful in this regard that some contemporary observers noted that the clause, more than any other provision of the Constitution, was a source of excessive and angry controversy. Others charged that the Contract Clause was the bastion of corporate privilege and a shield for corporate power. 31 To address this limitation, railroad attorneys in the Granger Cases proposed a subtle but important variation on the rule that a state cannot deprive a corporation of the essential object of its grant. Attorneys for the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad proposed the new theory to challenge the validity of a Wisconsin maximum rate law.
There they argued that, "This act … takes the income, and thus deprives the company of the beneficial use of its property, and the means of performing its engagements with its creditors, as if the road was confiscated." 33 The railroad's attorneys swayed one justice,
Stephen Field. 34 Northwestern Railroad, warned that "The idea that the legislature has the general power to set maximum rates is at war with every principle of free government, and all those provisions of our American Constitution which were designed to protect the natural rights of man against legislative aggression." 35 Regulation was also considered normal in nineteenth century legal doctrine.
Judges and commentators gave states wide latitude regarding economic regulation.
Moreover, they justified regulation not only in terms of balancing government power against individual liberty, but also in terms of protecting the rights of the public. Historian . Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84-5 (Mass., 1851). Shaw goes on to say "All property in this commonwealth…. Is derived directly or indirectly from the government, and held subject to those regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare." See, Scheiber, "Public Rights," supra note 59 at 222-23; Novak, Peoples Welfare, supra note 8, at 19-20. It is interesting that Shaw's language begins as a statement very similar to what advocates of laissez-faire constitutionalism would later use to describe the limits of property rights. That language, which was captured by the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others), differs only in that it drops the reference to the rights of the community.
to railroads as much as any other business and, although many states gave companies flexibility to set their own rates, regulation of railroad rates was a normal practice. 46 Both common practice regarding economic regulation and legal doctrine indicate that, if by radical we mean an agent of change, the term more accurately applies to railroad lawyers than proponents of rate regulation. The lawyers who represented the railroads in the Granger Cases were among the most distinguished lawyers in America.
They must have realized that under contract clause doctrine, as it stood, they really did not have very good cases. Yet they pressed on, in all likelihood because they had a purposeful and calculated desire to change the status of the law. They wanted to establish a doctrine that the Constitution guaranteed a fundamental right to be free of the type of price regulations created in the Granger laws. Such a doctrine would remove the issue of regulation from the political process. 47 Hindsight tells us that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Contract Clause, would provide the vehicle for change.
The idea behind this theory was that government regulation denied businesses of both their property and their liberty and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall deny any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The tactic of using the Fourteenth Amendment as a barrier to government regulation, however, was novel at the time. Ratified in 1868 in the aftermath of the Civil War, the amendment undoubtedly contained language sweeping enough to be used for the railroad leaders' purposes. Dissenting opinions in the The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), the first case to interpret the new Amendment, did support the idea that it provided protection for business. 48 Chicago's grain elevators were both a product and a symbol of the commercial revolution that was taking place in the late 19 th century. In this system of commerce the sale and storage of grain was not a local transaction as it had been in the past. Most of the grain produced in the Midwest in the I870s made its way to the Chicago lakefront.
There it was held for shipment via the Great Lakes or railroad to Eastern markets. All of the grain that reached this gathering point was stored in fourteen immense elevators, concentrated in one location, combined with the ability to disperse them quickly through a web of railroad routes, allowed buyers to hold their grain hoping for the highest price.
It essentially created a new business of speculating in grain futures. With speculation affecting the price of grain, farmers, whose livelihood had always been at the mercy of factors beyond their control, now faced still another obstacle that seemed just as unpredictable as the weather. 50
Adding to the farmers' dissatisfaction was the fact that cooperation among the nine Chicago firms allowed them to fix the prices they charged for storage of grain. This Kitch and Bowler point out that the most important reform for the Board of Trade was a system of uniform inspection. Rates were a secondary matter. Id. at 325. Railroad leaders expressed some concern about filling elevators for purposes of speculation. W.K. Ackerman to Capt. W.P. Halliday, September 6, 1881, W.K. Ackerman out-letters, Illinois Central, Newberry Library, Chicago, IL.
interstate commerce. But their most important claim was that the state regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
The concept of due process, sometimes referred to as "the law of the land,"
predates the Fourteenth Amendment. It traces its roots to the Magna Carta and is found in most state constitutions. It is also important to know that the guarantee is also found in the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Although standard constitutional doctrine of the time held that the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, did not apply to the states, the guarantee of due process of law was part of the U.S. Constitution for almost a century before Munn. Its most fundamental meaning was that no person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the benefit of proper judicial hearing and procedure. In Munn, however, company attorneys argued that due process promised more than a trial according to settled judicial procedure. The guarantee, they said, was also meant to protect private rights from arbitrary government interference. This theory concentrated on the substance of legislation rather than the procedure by which the law was enforced. Substantive due process, as it thus came to be called, would give the federal judiciary the authority to overrule state legislation that interfered with individual rights.
The idea that the Constitution prohibits arbitrary assertions of government power that threatened individual liberty is undoubtedly part of the American legal tradition, but there was only sparse legal precedent to support the theory of due process and judicial power the company attorneys were proposing. the company attorneys' skill was to show that setting maximum rates for grain elevators and railroads constituted the type of government activity that violated their clients' property rights.
The key was to convince the Court that regulation of rates amounted to having much in common. In neither case did the company have an actual monopoly, but in both they dominated some essential element of a particular business. All of the butchers in New Orleans had to ply their trade in the Crescent City Company's slaughterhouse. Similarly, all grain shipped through Chicago had to be stored in the elevators owned by a few firms that cooperated to fix prices. The only significant difference between the two situations was the source of their privileged position. The New Orleans slaughterhouse obtained its privilege by virtue of a government franchise;
the Chicago elevators attained theirs through private ownership and cooperation. This made all the difference in the world to Field but no difference at all to Waite and Bradley.
Waite used the company attorney's own commerce clause argument to explain why.
[The elevators] stand, to use again the language of counsel, in the very "gateway of commerce," and take a toll from all who pass. Their business most certainly "tends to a common charge, and is become a thing of public interest and use." Every bushel of grain for its passage "pays a toll, which is a common charge," and, therefore, according to Lord Hale, every such warehouseman "ought to be under public regulation, viz., that he take but Despite this strong language, even Field agreed that businesses were subject to the police power of the state. Unlike the majority, however, he did not believe that regulation of rates fell within the police power. Field did not give us much help in determining why he reached that conclusion. The police power, he said, extended to "Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals, and health of the community...." 72 In applying it, he continued, the state must be guided by the doctrine that each one must use his own and not to injure his neighbor. On the basis of these principles he then concluded that "The compensation which owners of property, not having any special rights or privileges from the government in connection with it, may demand for its use…" does 69 . Fairman, "The So-Called Granger Cases," supra note 62, at 670.
70
. Munn, 94 U.S. at 126.
71
. Munn, 94 U.S. at 140, Field dissenting. 72 . Id. at 145, Field dissenting. not fall within that power. 73 Perhaps the most important factor leading Field to this conclusion was the presumption from which he started. Constitutional provisions intended for the protection of property, he insisted, should be liberally construed. 74 His implication was that the Court should be wary of any statute that interfered with individual liberty.
The Waite majority, by contrast, started from the opposite presumption. Waite would assume that the legislation is valid unless proven otherwise. "Every statute is presumed to be constitutional," he wrote. "The court ought not to declare one to be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so. If there is doubt, the express will of the legislature should be sustained." 75 regulates the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." 79
The majority's presumption in favor of state legislation certainly disappointed railroad leaders and their attorneys who had hoped to move the question of what constituted reasonable rates and regulations from the legislative arena to the judicial.
Field captured their position, and their distrust for the democratic process, in his dissent.
"Government can scarcely be free where the rights of property are left solely dependent on the will of the legislative body without any restraint," he warned. 80 And, in his mind, it was the Court's duty to ensure that this did not happen.
Contrary to Field, the majority of the Court believed that, in most instances, property rights would be adequately protected without judicial interference. Of course Waite could not deny that a state might abuse its power. But, for protection against that potential abuse, he said, "people must resort to the polls, not to the courts. For railroad leaders, who placed much more faith in appellate courts than in elected legislatures, the majority decision inflicted a brutal blow. They had dreamed that the decision would establish an unequivocal right to be free of government regulation.
More realistically, they hoped it would produce a doctrine that the reasonableness of government rates and regulations was inherently a judicial question and that courts would 79 . Reformers, as would be expected, found comfort in the decision. Two years later delegates to the California constitutional convention pointed to Munn as proof that they had the authority to regulate railroad rates and fares. 85 And, even a decade later, a reform minded governor of Minnesota reminded the legislature that while the expediency of railroad regulation might be doubted, the right of the state to regulate is no longer in question. 86 Editors of the Minneapolis Tribune were even more confident. "The power to regulate roads has been confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the Granger Cases, there is no turning back and the ground will never be retraced." 87 83 . Jewett, Brief, supra note 55, at 662. Park grew, however, the plant became "… an unendurable nuisance to the inhabitants for many miles around its location…." 96 Some justices were sympathetic to the company's claim that the ordinance had the effect of confiscating its property without compensation. 97 But Justice Noah Swayne, who wrote the majority opinion, pointed out that the company's charter did not contain a provision expressly exempting it from claims of nuisance. Applying the rule of construction that a charter should be construed most strongly against the corporation, he concluded that the charter's silence on the matter was fatal to the company's claim. 98 The Court also continued to apply the principle that a legislature could not barter away the essential powers of sovereignty such as the police power. In Beer Company v.
Massachusetts a corporation that had received a charter to manufacture beer claimed that a subsequent state prohibition law violated the contract clause. Writing for the majority in Beer Company v. Massachusetts, Bradley reasoned that Beer Company's possession of a charter could not be construed as exempting the corporation to legitimate controls to which an individual citizen would be subject. The right of both the corporation and individual were held subject to the police power of the states. While Bradley did not attempt to define the police power he noted that protecting the lives, health, and property of citizens and preservation of good order and public morals "... belong emphatically to 96 that class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus populi suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law)." 99
It was not until after four new justices joined the Court in the early 1880s that attorneys for the corporate and business elite increased their efforts. They achieved some measure of success in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad (1886), which came to stand for the proposition that corporations are persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 100 Even then, however, they failed to obtain the kind of constitutional protections from government regulation that their clients wanted.
The Court continued to refuse to equate regulation with confiscation. It refused to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as providing a general restriction on government regulation of business. In cases challenging the validity of regulations it continued to rely on the antebellum legal tradition that emphasized the right of the community as a limit on property. The ideas and theories that corporation and business attorneys pressed were gradually becoming part of constitutional discourse, but their elevation to constitutional doctrine would have to wait until after the Waite era. 
